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The increase in the safety and privacy of automated vehicle drivers against hazardous cyber-attacks will 
lead to a considerable reduction in the number of global deaths and injuries. In this sense, the European 
Commission has focused attention on the security of communications in high-risk systems when 
receiving a cyber-attack such as automated vehicles. The project SerIoT comes up as an possible solution, 
providing a useful open and reference framework for real-time monitoring of the traffic exchanged 
through heterogeneous IoT platforms. This system is capable of recognize suspicious patterns, evaluate 
them and finally take mitigate actions. The paper presents a use case of the SerIoT project related to 
rerouting tests in vehicular communication. The goal is to ensure secure and reliable communication 
among Connected Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) components (vehicles, infrastructures, etc) 
using the SerIoT’s system capabilities to detect and mitigate possible network attacks. Therefore, fleet 
management and smart intersection scenarios were chosen, where vehicles equipped with On Board 
Units (OBU) interact with each other and Road Side Units (RSU) to accomplish an optimal flow of traffic. 
These equipments use the SerIoT systems to deal with cyber-attacks such as Denial of Service (DoS). Tests 
have been validated in different scenarios under threats situations. It shows the great performance of the 
SerIoT system taking the corresponding actions to ensure a continuous and safety traffic flow.
© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND 
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
1. Introduction
Cyber threats impact every area of life that depends on exchange of information. The threat is increasing to critical levels, particularly 
with the rapid adoption of the Internet of Things (IoT), leading to a 100% increase in IoT threats from 2019 to 2020 [37]. The increase 
in cyber-physical systems means that a cyber-attack not only affects the realm of pure information, but can also have effects in physical 
environments possibly endangering human life and causing material damage. Such a danger poses a severe threat within the intensely 
developing field of Connected Autonomous Vehicles (CAV). For example, a malfunction in the steering systems of a vehicle, controlled 
by digital devices, can lead to severe injuries or even death. Hence, there is a strong focus on cyber-security in autonomous vehicle 
projects focusing on V2X communications where the vehicle can communicate with everything i.e. vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-
infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-network (V2N), vehicle-to-cloud (V2C), vehicle-to-device (V2D) and vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P).
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tacks include: remotely controlling the vehicles [34]; accessing and changing the CAN bus messages [4]; denying message exchange by 
simultaneously sending messages that affects the network [3]; and others that have been carried out in the past.
This article presents the SerIoT system, developed within the H2020 project of the same name [49], as a means to mitigate cyber 
attacks against CAV environments. The SerIoT project provides a number of security solutions including: protection of the core networks 
interconnecting IoT devices; IoT-specific solutions for anomaly detection (AD); early mitigation through re-routing to specialized analytic 
devices such as honeypots; and, automated mitigation for autonomous vehicles. The following article takes a closer look at these solutions.
Specifically, this work utilizes the secure network architecture provided by the SerIoT project to facilitate resilient vehicular commu-
nications in non-time critical scenarios. The work exploits the capabilities of anomaly detection and mitigation combined with intelligent 
routing to provide dynamic re-routing around attacked resources, within a time-frame that ensures seamless vehicular operation. We 
evaluate the system performance using realistic simulation environments, an international testbed and experimental settings, using real 
vehicles operated on the premises of Tecnalia. Our evaluation shows the system’s ability to detect anomalous behavior and act upon it 
within seconds, sufficiently fast to support non-time critical vehicle maneuvers. The article is structured as follows. In section 2, it presents 
the state of the art in cyber-security for communication with autonomous cars. The next, section 3, is devoted to the system architecture 
of SerIoT and describes the basic features that distinguish a SerIoT network from other types of networks, with particular attention paid 
to multi-agent anomaly detection. Then, sections 4 and 5 describe the details of the automated driving framework and specific Use Cases 
in which the SerIoT project solutions were tested. The article finally ends by presenting the results and conclusions.
2. State of the art
Connected autonomous vehicles generate, exchange and process data at intensive rates by virtue of incorporating a large number of IoT 
sensors and actuators. This section reviews the state of the art literature in vehicular communications and cybersecurity, including related 
work in anomaly detection and mitigation solutions.
2.1. Vehicular communication
Vehicular communications are generally developed as part of Cooperative Intelligent Transportation Systems (C-ITS) as communications 
between vehicles and other agents improving the efficiency and security of the control systems. Vehicular communication networks are 
flexible communication systems that guarantee optimal real-time transmissions between devices in different environments (i.e. cities, 
roads, ports, etc.), exchanging information, such as safety warnings, traffic information, orders and movements to be carried out, etc [42]. 
As a cooperative approach, vehicle communication systems can be more effective in avoiding accidents and traffic congestion than if each 
vehicle tries to solve these problems individually [51].
The vehicular communication standard defined in the United States is Dedicated Short Range Communications (DSRC) and Europe 
defines its standard as Intelligent Transport System (ITS-G5). Colloquially and globally, this technology can be defined as vehicular Wi-Fi, 
since it is based on IEEE 802.11.p, but with the requirement for low latency communication, essential for safety applications. The final 
draft of the standard was approved in 2009 [22]. It is a short/medium-range wireless communication channel that works at 5.9 GHz, with 
a bandwidth of 75 MHz and an approximate range of 1000 m.
The vehicular communication systems that are commonly used in the connection between vehicles, infrastructure, and operators are 
made up of two main components: the OBU (On-Board Unit) which is in the vehicle, and the RSU (Road-Side Unit) which is in the infras-
tructure. This technology has been validated after numerous field tests with commercial equipment. For example, one of the largest pilots 
has been funded by the U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) for 45 million USD [57]. Various applications have been implemented 
at different sites (Tampa, Wyoming, and New York). In Tampa, in collaboration with Hyundai, data was collected during 18 months of 
testing, during which the system warned drivers of the following hazards: accessing an oncoming highway (14 cases); potential collisions 
with the tram (9 cases); speeding (1,500 cases per month) [55].
The largest pilot is in New York, currently having more than 3,000 cars, buses, and fleet vehicles. However, due to the conditions 
presented in the city (i.e. large buildings), the signal from satellite navigation systems is not reliable. Therefore, these scenarios emerge 
as a good example to show the benefits of the deployment of RSUs on the road, improving the positioning of the vehicles [33]. Other 
activities carried out by the USDOT on automated vehicles can be found at [58].
On the other hand, the CAR2CAR Communication Consortium (C2C-CC) is led by European and international vehicle manufacturers, 
equipment suppliers, engineering companies, road operators and research institutions. This initiative contributes to the development and 
specification of robust and reliable solutions that allow technologies driven by innovation, thereby fostering concepts of cooperation 
between the road users and with the road infrastructure sharing information (V2X communication). This is based on the development of a 
European industry standard for vehicular communication systems, active safety application prototyping and demonstrations [44]. Likewise, 
in Europe, several projects have been developed based on vehicle communications research [51] such as MARSS-5G [11] and PRESERVE 
[12]. An analysis of the EU’s competitive positioning related to challenges and opportunities of IoT for connected and autonomous vehicles 
and the key actors is presented in [61], where it presents relevant stakeholders and a clear overview of the current and future landscape 
of these technologies in the EU.
Therefore, as modern vehicles are capable of connecting to an external infrastructure and V2X communication matures, the necessity to 
secure communications is increasing due to the real risk that vehicles are subjected to cyber-attacks that target vehicular communications 
and compromise the security on the road. Thus, it is necessary from a design point of view, to profile threats and structure a mitigation 
plan based on best practices for cybersecurity. An overview of this relationship between vehicle safety and its functions, and cybersecurity, 
has been previously studied by Nilsson et al. [36].2
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Cybersecurity itself is a huge topic and there are many published works in the area. Specifically for IoT, useful survey papers report the 
relevant literature in the general IoT area [23] and more specifically for Vehicular systems [9]. Additionally, IoT systems are increasingly 
reliant on Cloud and Fog computing so that this area of cybersecurity is also an important consideration [53].
While there are specific cybersecurity solutions discussed in this paper and many more in the wider literature, it is vital that the 
cybersecurity solution itself remains secure. This is particularly important as security infrastructure often has access to critical systems 
and sensitive data as these are the most important to protect. Indeed, there have been recent cases of security systems themselves 
being the cause of serious vulnerabilities [54]. Traditional network security architectures have relied upon a so called “moats-and-castles” 
approach with trusted zones kept separate by systems such as firewalls. However, more recent approaches have proposed using a zero-trust
architecture [47] which moves to a model where every system is treated as untrusted until it has been authenticated and all connectivity 
is authenticated, audited and encrypted. For a security system, such a zero-trust approach is to be preferred and increasingly becoming 
the architecture of choice [39]. Within such a zero-trust architecture, as selected for use in SerIoT, the auditing of connectivity is often 
used as a mechanism for anomaly detection which leads to automated mitigation strategies as discussed in the following subsections.
2.3. Anomaly detection
In recent years, Machine Learning (ML), Neural Networks (NN) and Deep Learning (DL) algorithms have been widely used to detect 
malicious traffic and classify network attacks. Various examples that use Deep NN can be found in the literature such as the intrusion 
detection system (IDS) presented in [24] or the IDS method presented in [60], which used low-level spatial features of network traffic.
Multiple studies have proposed graph-based solutions to detect abnormalities, i.e. representing the IoT entities and communication 
links as nodes and edges of a graph network. Such a graph-based research for anomaly detection was presented in [56], where the web 
traffic (i.e. web requests and connections to web servers) was modeled using graphs to point out probable malicious-clients (e.g. botnet 
members). An Attention-based temporal Graph Convolutional Network (GCN) model was developed in [65], where temporal features were 
used to identify anomalous edges of the graph within dynamic graphs. Another dynamic graph anomaly detection was developed in [64], 
where deep auto-encoders in conjunction with clustering techniques were employed on the nodes of the network to identify anomalies 
in real-time.
Another scheme utilizing anomaly detection using a Graph Neural Network (GNN) was proposed in [5]. In this study, the interconnec-
tions of the involved nodes were taken into account in the computed adjacency matrix, along with various topological characteristics of 
the graph. Edge-level anomaly detection methods were proposed in [10] and [50]. In these cases, the malicious edges are determined using 
the density of sub-graphs along with structural, temporal, and content feature extraction and a greedy search mechanism, respectively. An 
anomaly node detection model was proposed in [2] applying a probabilistic approach of detection.
A detailed overview of Recurrent, Convolutional, Auto-encoders and Spatial-Temporal Graph neural network approaches was presented 
in [62] resulting in a taxonomy of GNNs mechanisms applied in several IoT application domains. In [16] and [45] an attack detection 
scheme was proposed where agents implementing a GNN model offered both localized monitoring in IoT networks and feature exchange 
in a distributed synergistic detection mechanism. This approach will be used in this paper and is briefly presented in section 3.4.
Enhancing security mechanisms in the modern Internet of Vehicles field is a challenging task researched extensively in several studies. 
Most approaches utilize techniques based on ML and DL: An example of DL use is presented in [21], where the authors propose a 
long short-term memory-based (LSTM) detection system against in-vehicle CAN bus network attacks such as DoS, Fuzzing and Spoofing, 
whereas in [28] a DL approach is deployed on the side of the Cloud to apply the detection process, while offloading the burden of DL 
heavy computation to a server with more computational resources. They deal with DoS, command injection and malware attack examples, 
using time-series data as input to their proposed neural network. An example of ML use is presented in [63], a multi-tier algorithm is 
developed, combining signature-based and zero-day attack detection. The developed schema uses two ML stages for data pre-processing 
and feature engineering and four learning tiers. The algorithm is evaluated against offline datasets. An extensive review of the subject of 
anomaly detection in V2X is available in [46].
2.4. Mitigation approaches
Threat mitigation of cyber-systems, including IoT systems, can be classified in one of the following two approaches: 1) design tools 
to mitigate a single attack type e.g. a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) [67] which can be handled using Software Defined Network-
ing (SDN), examples of such approaches can be found in various review studies such as [1] and [30]; 2) select mitigation actions or 
countermeasures by employing mechanisms that optimize one or more metrics related to the system.
Solutions that belong to the second category can additionally be divided into three separate classes as described below. The first 
includes approaches that measure the values of one or more measures but offer no automated mechanism or response to the threats 
faced by the system. In this case the operator must make a manual choice. Such a mechanism is presented in [19].
The second class involves the automated mitigation of attacks using thresholds based on the values of the metrics. Based on predefined 
scenarios and values, the system chooses predefined actions to react to the threats. An example of a threshold-based tool is available in 
[26]. Such approaches can be difficult to scale up.
The last class includes approaches where the selection of mitigation actions is based on the optimization of the value of one or 
more metrics. One example is [66] where the authors select mitigation actions by trying to minimize the cost required to deploy. Often, 
Evolutionary Algorithms are used to solve these optimization problems as in [6].
Concerning the mitigation of attacks against V2X communication networks, the majority of past works focused on approaches that 
countered a single attack type. In [52], the authors present an exhaustive list of threats against V2X networks along with countermeasures 
against them, all based on utilizing an SDN based network architecture, similar to the solutions proposed in this work. In [38], researchers 
present a comprehensive presentation of attacks against vehicular communication networks along with schemes to mitigate them. They 
distinguish between three broad approaches, in which the mitigation schemes depend on the attack detection method: 1) intrusion 3
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are handled by the SerIoT decision system presented in 3.2 and finally 3) Cryptography based methods.
3. Security SerIoT framework
The SerIoT system aims to provide a useful and reference framework for real-time monitoring of the traffic exchanged through IoT 
platforms within the IoT network to recognize suspicious patterns, to evaluate them, and finally to decide on the detection while offering 
parallel mitigation actions.
3.1. SerIoT system architecture
The secure network communication system for IoT devices developed within the SerIoT project (referred to as the SerIoT network 
hereafter) consists of a number of components. Its general architecture is shown in Fig. 5 of the document [25], where several basic parts 
are presented:
1. Network domain, based on SDN technology, equipped with path optimization mechanisms according to different criteria that can be 
applied simultaneously; the network domain includes SerIoT Fog components.
2. Management domain and functions, including Anomaly Detection modules, monitors network traffic to ensure the security of network 
elements and clients.
3. User domain or network edge elements, including Honeypots and Autopolicy modules.
Components belonging to domains 1 and 2 are included in the solution proposed in the paper, and the architecture of the pilot system 
presented in the paper is shown in Fig. 1. The components are described in the subsequent sections.
3.2. The SerIoT decision system
The SerIoT network is based on SDN technology. The use of SDN, in which the data plane and the control plane are separated, made 
it possible to combine the concept of Cognitive Packets, developed in [17], with a network based on a standard four-layer architecture 
using the TCP/IP protocol stack. The combination allows the advantages of Cognitive Packet Networks to be used in industry-standard 
networks. Cognitive Packets provide the network with real time measurements of the state of the network without the need of estimation 
or statistical evaluation. Cognitive Packets simply traverse the network and, by sampling the performance as the progress, report the actual 
state to the Cognitive Network Map in the controller.
The SerIoT network, using SDN and the Openflow management protocol [31], extends its mechanisms with two essential, closely related 
elements. SDN is managed centrally, by an SDN controller located outside the data plane of the network. The controller, controlling the 
data plane devices (called switches or forwarders), decides on the paths along which the data belonging to the individual connections 
(flows) are routed in the network, and on the admission of devices to communicate in the network. To make the right decisions, SDN 
needs a decision-making module and data on the state of the network. The smart decision module referred to as the SerIoT Routing 
Engine (SRE) is based on the Random Neural Network approach. The SRE is supported by a data-gathering solution – a cognitive packets 
(CP) mechanism, integrated into the SerIoT network to provide data for the SRE [15].
Cognitive Packets are special-purpose packets, designed to measure link latency in the network. CP works in two modes. The classic 
approach uses time-synchronized devices, and the timestamp of every device is included in the payload of the CP. The packet wanders 
through the network, along the actual paths for given flows and also alternative paths, measuring end-to-end delay on the path, and 
sending the data to the SRE. When time-synchronization between neighboring nodes in the network cannot achieve the desired accuracy 
an alternative way of measurement is used by measuring RTT to the neighboring node and sending this directly to the controller [14]
[15].
As a SerIoT SDN Controller, we use standard SDN software, ONOS [40]. On top of it, the SerIoT Routing Engine (SRE) is built, using 
Random Neural Networks for routing decisions. For each forwarder in the data plane, an individual neural network is created, consisting 
of the number of neurons equal to the number of forwarder outputs. The networks are then trained with the use of the Reinforcement 
Learning algorithm. The training is continuous, as new incoming data from the cognitive packets train the Neural Networks making them 
reacting relevantly to the current situation in the network without losing the history. Thanks to the training, the most stimulated neuron 
in each RNN indicates the output by which a given packet should be sent.
Reinforcement learning is based on the Goal Function, G(), formulated in (1), which the neural network tries to minimize [17]. Also, 
the RNNs take decisions aimed at minimizing the Goal function. G() may include one or many components. Typical usage includes QoS 
optimization and specifically reduction in average latency. In SerIoT we added additional components for security, energy, and privacy. 
Thus, the Goal function for a given flow and given path has the form:
G( f , p) = αQ ( f , p) + β S( f , p) + γ E( f , p) + π R( f , p), (1)
where Q ( f , p) denotes QoS value - latency of flow f on the path p. S( f , p) is a security function or trust factor; the trust level is given 
by external Anomaly Detection modules. E( f , p) is the energy used by devices in the path p when transporting the flow f . Last is R( f , p), 
which takes the value 0 when the path p matches the privacy policy for the flow f , and 1 — otherwise.
It should be noted, that not all four components of (1) need to be implemented in every SerIoT installation. These components, which 
are included in the implemented Goal function, are taken into account in the routing decisions of the SerIoT SDN Controller.4
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3.3. External mitigation
Except for decisions of the SRE, which are based on a mixture of weighted factors, where security assessment is only one of them, 
the SerIoT controller is able to accept decisions from external Monitoring & Mitigation components. The controller’s API allows external, 
authorized entities to send mitigation orders to change the routing of the traffic; for example: adding the sender to a block-list in the 
case of malicious traffic; or deflecting the traffic to a backup node in case of failure or denial of service; or, deflecting traffic to an 
analytic module e.g. a honeypot. This configuration requires an external entity to not only judge the anomaly level but also take decisions 
(automatically or by a human operator) that are implemented by the SerIoT controller. Such an entity is described in Section 3.5.
3.4. Multi-agent anomaly detection
Supporting co-operation among the interconnected network devices, the proposed Anomaly Detection method (AD) offers several of the 
advantages generally provided by multi-agent systems. To address multiple cyber-threats, such as DOS attacks, Port Scan and SSL attacks. 
The AD module engages a network of agents, from which it determines the network of involved devices, their inter-communication links, 
and significant traffic characteristics. Each agent is installed on a monitoring node of the network to implement a Graph Neural Network 
(GNN) algorithm.
It can be see in Fig. 2 that the algorithm takes as input traffic statistics and classifies the node as normal or abnormal reporting a 
probability value. Traffic information deriving from neighboring agents is also fed to the algorithm, which in turn results in a probability 
score describing the neighbor’s status. To this end, each node and edge is associated with a feature vector. The collection of feature vector 
parameters is captured for a successive time slot (denoting a time-window) thus each feature vector’s values captures traffic statistics 
within such time (see Table 1).
Specifically, to meet the needs of the Smart Intersection scenario of this article, a network monitoring tool has been developed based 
on the pmacct and nDPI [8] open-source monitoring tools to acquire Netflow v5 traffic characteristics and assist in the classification of the 
monitoring nodes.
3.4.1. Node and edge feature vectors
Assigning attributes to the network nodes requires the information to be captured in a flow-wise manner. Afterward, the detection 
algorithm averages the connection’s duration, sent/received packets and sent/received bytes information per node and connection link, 
thus generating the GNN input node and edge feature vector accordingly.5
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Features used for the Anomaly Detection.
Fig. 2. The Graph Neural Network architecture comprising two Multi-Layer Perceptrons both for Edge and Node Deep Neural Network implementation. Edge Deep Neural 
Network takes as input the features of neighboring nodes and updates the edge feature vector, whereas the Node Deep Neural Network is fed with the adjacent updated 
edge features so as to update the feature vector of each particular node.
3.4.2. GNN model architecture
The Graph Neural Network architecture comprises two Multi-Layer Perceptrons for Edge and Node Deep Neural Network implemen-
tations. (Fig. 2.) The Edge Deep Neural Network takes as input the features of neighboring nodes and updates the edge feature vector, 
whereas the Node Deep Neural Network is fed with the adjacent updated edge features to update the feature vector of each particular 
node. Probability scores are reported to spread the knowledge regarding the status of the environment (neighboring nodes) and the status 
of a node itself. The most significant functions denoting the feature vectors of the edges and nodes are explained below. Given a network 
represented as a Graph structure G(V , E) with nodes V interconnected by edges E the edges interconnecting them, we define a node 
feature vector for every node and an edge feature vector to associate with each edge on the graph. We assume neighboring nodes denoted 
as i and j. Traffic statistic measurements that populate their feature vectors are collected in successive time slots [(t − 1)T , tT ], where t 
is the slot’s index and T its length.
Therefore we denote equation (2) below in which an edge’s current feature vector ek,ti j along with these of the nodes it interconnects, 
are used to update its features, as xk,tj is the t-th value of x j (feature vector of node j) in the k-th time slot and similarly x
k,t
i is the t-th 
value of xi in the k-th time-slot (feature vector of node i).
ek+1,ti j → E DN N(xk,tj , xk,ti , ek,ti j ) (2)
Consequently, a node’s feature values along with the feature values of the nodes it communicates with and the values of the associated 
edges, are used to update its vector as follows
xk+1,tj → N DN N(et−1j , xk,tj ) (3)
Following this procedure, the average value of the features, associated with the edges between a node and its neighbors as well as the 
average value of features associated with the nodes neighboring a specific node is calculated. The probability score of node i and j is then 
reported.
3.5. Mitigation engine
The scope of the Mitigation Engine module is to provide mitigation actions against threats or when an attack to the network is 
detected, based on AI. The main functionality of this component is the automated decision of the mitigation action based on the output of 
the Anomaly Detection module. The module was implemented in Python, while the Pytorch framework is used for the Pointer Networks 
[59].
For each of the attacks or threats detected by the system, multiple mitigation actions might be available but a single action must be 
chosen. An AI solution was developed, using reinforcement learning via a DNN architecture called Pointer Networks [59]. We modified the 
architecture to select a set of countermeasures to be applied, based on optimizing multiple security-related KPIs while taking into account 
constraints. Separate DNNs are used to solve the problem separately for each KPI. A decomposition method called Normalized Normal 
Constraint [32] uses the initial solutions to transform the problem to a single objective, also solved by a Pointer network. This solution is 
transformed back to result in the Pareto solution set for the entire multi-objective optimization problem.
An additional mechanism is implemented for the RSU units. When an attack is detected on them, the system checks a predefined list 
of all RSUs: if an uncompromised unit is available, all traffic is redirected to it. The mitigation actions are finally sent to the SerIoT SDN 
Controller (see Section 3.6) to be applied to the network.6
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Abstract OpenFlow rules for redirect action.
Source Destination Instructions
Host A Host B IP destination = host C IP,
MAC destination = host C MAC
Host C Host A IP source = host B IP,
MAC source = host B MAC
3.6. Mitigation enforcement in the SerIoT controller
Upon receiving a mitigation query, or making an autonomous decision, the SerIoT Routing Engine (SRE) utilizes the Mitigation Enforce-
ment to provide the requested mitigation for the network. Since the SerIoT core network is an SDN network the SRE utilizes the OpenFlow 
protocol (version >= 1.3) to enable mitigation actions. The SRE can enforce several mitigation actions – only those used in experiments 
and use cases reported in this paper will be described here in detail.
Block - this mitigation action is performed on-forwarder or many forwarders to which specified endpoints (source and destination) 
are connected to. This mitigation action blocks all traffic on a flow described by source and destination (protocol IP address and port). If 
there are no such devices in the network this mitigation action is enforced on all of the forwarders in the network. This mitigation action 
is enforced until time t which is specified by the administrator of the network. After time t , if the device has stopped being malicious, 
it can connect to the network again. The identified flow is translated into the OpenFlow rules with the action specified to drop any 
incoming packets that are fulfilling that rule. The OpenFlow match fields contain the source and destination of specified endpoints - e.g. 
(OFPXMT_OFB_ETH_TYPE = IPv4, OFPXMT_OFB_IPV4_SRC = 10.0.1.2). For all possible fields for the OpenFlow rule, see page 42 of [41]. The
priority is set to highest possible value (59999 in ONOS implementation). The instructions field is set to DROP and the timeout field 
is set to t . An OpenFlow rule prepared in such a way guarantees that traffic matching the specified flow will be dropped on the first 
forwarder it reaches. All fields of the OpenFlow rules are based on the documentation for the OpenFlow Switch in version 1.3.0 [41].
Block-list - this mitigation action is very similar to Block but the connection for described flow is severed until the flow is allow-listed 
unlike the Block action where the connection is resumed after the time t .
Block-list MAC - this mitigation action forbids certain MAC addresses from entering the SerIoT network. It’s installed on all of the 
forwarders and is valid until the MAC address is allow-listed. This is used to mitigate the attacks based on spoofing the source IP address.
Deflect (reroute) - this mitigation action utilizes OpenFlow version 1.3 and higher. This action is designed to reroute traffic between
host A and host B to host C in that way that host A thinks it is connected to the host B. This action can be used in several different ways 
(e.g. to redirect an attacker to a honeypot). The mitigation action is translated into the OpenFlow rules in such a way that the match fields
are the same as host A, B, and C. The instruction field is created in such a way that the rule is masking the real destination by assigning 
and reassigning the IP and MAC addresses (see Table 2). This mitigation action can transparently swap the destination host of the flow. 
The priority must be set to be of value max(prioritiesinthenet work) + 1 - otherwise, there can be a flow rule with such a priority that 
the deflection action would be out-prioritized.
4. Automated driving framework
This section presents the test platforms used to validate the SerIoT system under C-ITS environments. In order to safely represent the 
scenarios described in Section 5, a mixed environment test was chosen. In this type of environment, a real vehicle is used to execute a 
specific maneuver whereas virtual components such as vehicles, traffic lights, among others help to complement the scenario [20].
The real platform consists of a Renault Twizy 80, capable of reaching 80 Km/h, and this is equipped with different sensors such as 
LiDAR, Laser, D-GPS, among others. Moreover, it is instrumented with two servo-motors, one for steering control, and another for brake 
control; and an Electronic Control Unit (ECU) for throttle control. The virtual vehicle is simulated through the Dynacar® environment [43], 
which uses a multi-body model to virtually represent the vehicles [7], and a 3D interface to monitor them. The traffic lights, as well as 
the control station in charge of supervising the scenario, are simulated through the Matlab/Simulink software.
Both platforms run the AUDRIC© architecture, which consists of the 6 blocks distribution proposed by [18]: acquisition, perception, 
communication, decision, control, and actuation (see Fig. 3). The acquisition block is in charge of collecting the data coming from the 
on-board sensors (real platform) or the multi-body model (virtual platform). The perception block generates the virtual vehicle and the 
representations of the obstacles. The communication block is where all the information of other ITS components is gathered using V2X 
technologies and where the main contribution of this work is located. The decision module generates the trajectory and the actions to be 
taken during the driving process. The control block is related to the longitudinal and lateral controllers. The actuation module interprets 
the control signals to generate the values that can be used by the multi-body model or the actuators, depending on the case.
In order to communicate to each component, V2X communication devices are used; an OBU communicates with the real and virtual 
vehicles; and, an RSU to communicate with the control station and the traffic lights (see Fig. 3). These devices are equipped with a 
dual 5.9 GHz antenna with GPS/GLONASS, Wi-Fi and Wi-Max capabilities. Furthermore, the devices have a security module that ensures 
the confidentiality of the data content by using symmetric or asymmetric cryptography and keys known only by trusted participants, 
following the normative IEEE 1609.2-2016. This, ensures each component can transmit their corresponding information according to the 
ETSI-G5 standards [29]. Specifically, in this work, two types of message protocols are used: 1) Geo-Network (GN) [27] and 2) Decentralized 
Environmental Notification Message (DENM) [48].
Geo-Networking supports heterogeneous application requirements, including applications for road safety, traffic efficiency and infotain-
ment. More specifically, it enables periodic transmission of safety status messages at a high rate, rapid multi-hop dissemination of packets 
in geographical regions for emergency warnings [13]. Therefore, this protocol is selected to transmit two types of information:
• The identification of the route followed by the vehicle. With this information, the control station can supervise the trajectory followed 
by the vehicles.7
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Fig. 4. Fleet management scenario description.
• The status of each traffic light. Due to the flexibility of the GN messages, a shorter version of the SPAT protocol with only the specific 
fields needed in the test can be sent fulfilling the requirements needed.
The DENM is a facilities layer message that is mainly used by ITS applications in order to alert road users of a detected event using ITS 
communication technologies [13]. Regarding the present work, the messages transmitted correspond to unexpected road works warnings.
5. Use case
In this section, two sub-use cases of the SerIoT project are presented. The goal is to show SerIoT system capabilities to detect and 
mitigate the attack of a network link, under complex driving scenarios with non-critical communication requirements. To do so, two 
different detection and mitigation methods were implemented, one in each scenario.
The analysis presented here is based on Research Questions, as defined in SerIoT project report [35], namely:
1. Will SerIoT efficiently detect and mitigate against a fake operation in cooperative maneuvers? (RQ-SE-21-00)
2. Will SerIoT operation affect latency in Automated Driving non-critical comms.? (RQ-QS-21-001)
3. Will SerIoT operation affect loss of packets in Automated Driving non-critical comms.? (RQ-QS-21-003)
4. Do potential Automated Driving users perceive SerIoT as a useful system? (RQ-UA-21-001)
5.1. Sub use case 1: fleet management
The first scenario consists of a fleet of vehicles under a traffic jam problem (see Fig. 4). In this scenario, the route of Vehicle 2 (V2) is 
modified via V2I communications when a traffic jam is located by Vehicle 1 (V1). This route change is instigated through communication 
with RSU 2 and the Control Station (CS), which is in charge of monitoring the vehicles. More specifically, during this process, the vehicles 
are indicating to the Control Station, through GN messages, the route that they follow. When a traffic jam is encountered, the vehicle 
sends a warning message to the Control Station, using the DENM protocol. Once the warning message is detected, the Control Station 
sends a GN message indicating the new route to follow.
In order to test the SerIoT system, a Denial of Service (DoS) attack is introduced in the infrastructure. The goal of the attack is to 
produce a bottleneck in the road by overloading the RSU close to the conflict point (K1), thus, producing its shutdown. By doing so, the 
vehicle (V2) cannot change the route, despite the message sent by the vehicle (V1). As a mitigation action, a reroute of the packet traffic 
from one RSU2 to RSU1 is proposed, so the message can be transmitted normally, and the vehicle can change the route. We can observe 
this scenario in greater detail in the presented data flow of the components in the network (see Fig. 5). Note that two mitigation actions 
for the attack are proposed – first, it attempts to block the attacker but due to limited knowledge of the lightweight detector deployed on 8
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the RSU1 and RSU2 only the MAC address of the attacker can be obtained. Then it proceeds to ensure the communication between RSU1, 
the server and the vehicle by rerouting packets for the attacked RSU.
In Fig. 1, the connectivity scheme of the UC is presented. In this figure, it can be seen that the SerIoT system is located between the 
RSUs and the Control Station. To enable connectivity that emulates a network provider configuration, the RSUs were connected to carrier 
class switches that were controlled through SDN. The switches were interconnected through 10 Gb/s optical links as would be expected 
in a metropolitan area network. However, because the different infrastructures (UC and network/SerIoT infrastructure) were hosted at 
different partner sites, inter-connectivity was back-hauled to the SDN switches and SerIoT components through a virtual private network 
(VPN) connection. The VPN connection was closely monitored and found to provide consistent delay (30 ms ± 0.35 ms) with no packet 
loss at the bit-rates used by the UC.
5.2. Sub use case 2: smart intersection
The second Sub Use Case consists of a Smart Intersection scenario where an algorithm manages the control of the traffic light, in 
order to coordinate the vehicles around the intersection. This coordination is mainly performed through V2I communication. In Fig. 6 a 
description of the scenario is presented. Vehicle 1 (V1) follows a predefined route, arriving towards the intersection. Vehicle 2 (V2) also 
follows a predefined path and arrives towards the same intersection in another road segment. The traffic lights (TL1 and TL2) broadcast 
their information (state, time to change, etc.) via Road Side Units (RSU1 and RSU2). V1 receives TL1 information through its OBU, and 
continues its trajectory when TL1 is green, or stops when is red, while V2 on the other side of the intersection does the same with TL2 
and its OBU. The control station is in charge of controlling both traffic lights.
As with UC1, to test the SerIoT system a DoS attack was introduced in the infrastructure. In this case, the goal of the attack is to 
produce an accident in the intersection by disabling the RSU2 in charge of transmitting the information of the traffic light 2. By doing so, 
if there is no human intervention, the vehicles crash at the intersection point. As a mitigation action, the same rerouting option is taken 
into consideration, nevertheless, a different method to detect and execute the rerouting is implemented. The exact data flow between 
components in this scenario is presented in Fig. 7.
The connectivity scheme of this UC is similar to the one presented in Fig. 1. The same connection between the SerIoT system and the 
infrastructure is used, adding two traffic lights, one for each RSU. The main differences are the SerIoT modules used with the addition of 
Fog nodes at the network edge to detect the DoS attack.9
Fig. 6. Smart intersection scenario description. (For interpretation of the colors in the figure(s), the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 7. The data flow between components in the smart intersection use case.
6. Experimental results and discussion
The tests were developed in the Tecnalia test tracks, according to the methodology explained in Section 5. The vehicle V1 is virtually 
represented with the Dynacar® simulator, whereas the vehicle V2 is the Renault Twizy 80. During the tests, both vehicles run at 16 Km/h.
Each maneuver will be represented by a sequence of images of both vehicles. Each image has three components:
• The right figure with the plot of the vehicles positioning over time. Being the blue rectangle, V1, and the orange rectangle, V2. In the 
case of Smart intersection, intersection traffic lights are also displayed.
• The lower left figure corresponds to the Dynacar® visualization of the virtual vehicle.
• The upper left figure corresponds to the real vehicle.
6.1. Fleet management
Regarding the fleet management use case, Fig. 8 shows a sequence of images of both vehicles during the maneuver. Fig. 8a shows at 
the beginning both vehicles follow the same path, and once V1 arrives at the KX1 point in the second lap (Fig. 8b) it sends a DENM 
message to the control station, which orders V2 to change the route. This change can be seen in Fig. 8c. Finally, Fig. 8d shows V2 driving 
through route 2.
Performance results of the SerIoT system for the fleet management UC are shown in Table 3. The average time of detection of the 
DoS attack by the lightweight anomaly detector was 4.34 s. This was a major component of the system’s response time to an emergency 
situation. Additional components with a total value well below 200 ms are the delay introduced by the VPN in the experimental setup 
and the controller response time to the mitigation command.
6.2. Smart intersection
Regarding the smart intersection use case, Fig. 9 shows a image sequence of the maneuver where it can be seen the vehicles crossing 
the intersection without difficulties, even though the DoS attack has occurred. Fig. 9a presents the beginning of the scenario, where JID:VEHCOM AID:100425 /FLA [m5G; v1.310] P.10 (1-16)
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Fig. 8. Fleet management sequence.11
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initially T1 is in red and the T2 in green. Fig. 9b shows when V1 stops at the traffic light T1, whereas V2 approaches T2. In Fig. 9c, it 
can be observed that V2 is stopping at T2, whereas V1 accelerates due to T1 changing to green. Finally, 9d shows V2 accelerating once T2 
changes to green.
In Table 4 the average reaction times of the SerIoT system in this UC are presented. The metrics used for the evaluation of the 
distributed Anomaly Detection module were Accuracy of Detection, and Detection time. Violation of the normal traffic pattern, brought 12
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Fig. 11. Cumulative Distribution Function for the E2E mitigation time in seconds for UC2, i.e. the time required to send the Mitigation Decision to the SDN system and receive 
confirmation.
by the DoS attack, is easily recognized within the analyzed data chunks in every abnormal scenario with 100% accuracy. Detection delay 
results are fast enough to allow for adequate time for the network to heal and restore to normal operation. More specifically, the multi-
agent AD module requires a mean time of 3.27 seconds with a standard deviation of 2.98 seconds, to alert the system for the security 
breach. This is depicted in the CDF of the detection latency in seconds as shown in Fig. 10. The results incorporate the time needed for the 
traffic collector to retrieve the abnormal flows together with the agent’s time to process the flows and send the anomaly probability report. 
The solution used in Section 5.2 requires a lot of additional infrastructure for it to be deployed but, its strength is that it is independent 
of the hardware and software limitations. The anomalous event was then passed to the Mitigation Engine in order for the mitigation rule 
to be applied.
The mean E2E time for the Mitigation Engine to receive data from the Anomaly Detection system and make a decision i.e. send the 
mitigation decision to the SDN and receive the answer that the mitigation have been enforced, is 1.58 seconds with a standard deviation 
of 0.199 seconds. Fig. 11 shows the Cumulative Distribution Function for the E2E mitigation time in seconds. These results include the 
VPN transport time which is adding 120 ms.
Table 3
Performance of the SerIoT system in the Fleet Management UC.
Detection Time Mitigation Time Detected Packet Loss
4.34 [s] 120 [ms] VPN connection time
+
46.6 [ms] pure mitigation action
0%
Table 4
Performance of the SerIoT system in Smart Intersection UC.
Detection Time Mitigation Time Detected Packet Loss
3.27 [s] 31.1 [ms] VPN connection time
+
1,576 [ms] pure mitigation action
0%13
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Finally, Fig. 12 shows the latency in the network between: an RSU and a Fog mitigation node; RSU to the Control Node; and, RSU to 
the cloud. This clearly demonstrates the benefit of using a fog implementation which brings a mitigation element very close to the end 
system to reduce overall latency.1
6.3. Discussion
In both Table 3 and Table 4, we can see that both distributed and local detectors are working similarly well with the fastest response 
seen in the distributed approach. The response time of a few seconds (on average less than 5 s) is acceptable for car traffic control, 
taking also into account that commercial implementation will allow for stronger time optimization of both hardware and software side. 
The solution shown in the Fig. 5 requires an adequate choice of hardware because it must be able to run the respective attack detector 
code. On the other hand, the local solution presented in Section 5.1 does not require previous training of the model with anomalous and 
normal traffic. We can see the trade-off between the flexibility and performance – combining those two approaches would increase the 
applicability of the solution – even as an off-the-shelf solution. Of course, the solution used in Section 5.2 requires a lot of additional 
infrastructure for it to be deployed but, its strength is that it is independent of the hardware and software limitations. We also can see 
that the execution time of sole process of the enforcement of the mitigation action by the SDN controller can be neglected – in the scope 
of the detection time, it can be treated as instantaneous (with the exclusion of the network-related delays due to the nature of the testbed 
used for the experiments).
7. Conclusions
Attacks on content and quality of service of the IoT platforms can have economic, energy, and physical security consequences that go 
way beyond the traditional Internet’s claimed lack of security, and beyond the threats posed by attacks to mobile telephony. The SerIoT 
platform is a system that can be used to secure IoT platforms and networks anywhere and everywhere because it implements and tests 
a generic IoT framework based on an adaptive smart Software Defined Network with verified components that can spearhead Europe’s 
success in the IoT.
Based on this flexibility, the proposed work presents the validation of the SerIoT system through cooperative maneuvers in an au-
tomated driving framework. The performance of these maneuvers is based on V2I communication taking into account the policies and 
developed technologies for a secure IoT developed in the SerIoT project.
The two use cases raised with their respective attack, detection, and mitigation systems were successfully implemented, validating each 
of the modules that make up the SerIoT system. Moreover, having two different methods to detect and mitigate the DoS attack, shows 
robustness in the system. In both cases, the malicious information was detected and the RSU affected was successfully replaced, re-routing 
its information to the other RSU. Therefore, the maneuvers can be carried out without any inconveniences from the vehicle’s perspective.
As we saw in Table 3 and Table 4, both systems perform well in non-critical areas of the autonomous driving, since neither systems 
produced any significant latency or packet loss. The trade-off is between the infrastructure and technical payload to deploy both solutions 
- we have a very hardware constrained solution presented in 5.1 and an infrastructure dependent solution in 5.2. From the results, the 
conclusion is that the hybrid approach would be most favorable - it mixes the hardware self-sufficiency of the second solution with the 
low deployment costs of the first.
Overall, the work demonstrates that security mitigation actions are both successful and fast enough for non-critical communication 
such as those between vehicles and road side infrastructure that is communicating general information about the state of the road in 
some distance ahead. However, the work also concludes that general purpose mitigation strategies are not yet fast enough to protect 
critical communication, for example a highly sloping road with non-line-of-sight to an obstacle where incorrect performance of the 
communications can lead to vehicle collisions. Therefore, in future research faster detection and mitigation strategies are needed, allowing 
complex driving scenarios that involve more vehicles and other types of intersections, where each component is provided with a secure 
and reliable communication.
1 This removes any latency caused by a VPN to interconnect the testbed components.14
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